[Assam] Low Intensity Conflict:Concepts, Principles, and Policy Guidelines - Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian

Ram Sarangapani assamrs at gmail.com
Tue Jun 12 21:02:03 PDT 2007


http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/jan-feb/sarkesian.html

As we have been discussing such conflicts (some call it 'war' while others
Low-Intensity conflicts), here is something I came across. Its a bit long -
but interesting reading.
Some excerpts pasted here - highlights mine.
___________________

A realistic and operationally relevant approach is suggested by Bernard
Fall: "*Just about anybody can start a 'little war' (which is what the
Spanish word guerrilla literally means), even a New York street gang.... But
all this has rarely produced the kind of revolutionary ground swell which
simply swept away the existing government."*2 Fall goes on to note that " .
. . *guerrilla warfare is nothing but a tactical appendage of a far vaster
political contest and that no matter how expertly it is fought by competent
and dedicated professionals, it cannot possibly make up for the absence of a
political rationale*."3

>From Fall's analysis, several observations emerge. *Revolutions are a
fundamental challenge to the existing political order and to those holding
power in the system. The essence of such conflicts is in gaining control of
the governing structure*. *Although all wars are political in nature,
revolutionary wars are unique in that they center on the political-social
system as the main battle arena, rather than on the armed forces*. This
focus is in sharp contrast to the conventional and Clausewitzian notion that
the center of gravity in war is the defeat and destruction of the enemy
armed forces.4 Revolutionary war is also quite distinct from nuclear war in
that it does not attempt to destroy the political-social system but to
capture it, and it limits itself to a particular geographic area.

Although armed conflict is an important part of revolution, it is not
necessarily the most important for revolutionary success. *As noted
previously, the center of gravity in revolution is the political-social
system and its psychological coherency.* Thus, political cadre and
psychological instruments are most important in determining the outcome of
such conflicts.

___________

My comments: Lines highlighted in blue is precisely why ULFA's in NOT a
"revolution" and those highlighted in black are precisely the reason why
ULFA's could be considered at best a guerrilla warfare organization or at
worst a terrorist organization.

IMHO the lines in red-brick color is something that ULFA has never depicted
as possessing, and why a political solution may be *very difficult to
achieve*. A military solution is not what I would like, as it just prolongs
the agony of an already beseiged state like Assam (though I understand why
the state wants the military to help out).

--Ram
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